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Abstract 
The article explores some of the assumptions behind the current valence of the notion of 
trust and in particular its entanglement in discourses of social robustness, the 
management and reporting of (corporate) knowledge, and its underlying culture and 
systems of responsibility. It unfolds by contrasting classic and contemporary 
anthropological work on cultures of suspicion, culpability and spiritual ambiguity with 
the new vocabulary of capitalist corporate ethics. Finally, the argument examines the 
work that relationships do when moving in and out of the occult, and contrasts it with 
the kind of temporal work that capitalism demands from relationships to remain 
diaphanous. If public trust functions as the political epistemology of neoliberal society, 
an anthropological theory of trust ought perhaps to reaffirm instead our trust in 
anthropological theory and comparison. 
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Everybody talks about trust these days. Or rather, everybody talks about a crisis in 
public trust and its fatal consequences for the institutional organisation of society (e.g. 
O'Hara 2004; O'Neill 2002). Trust, so the argument goes, is one of our most precious 
social virtues and its disappearance or misuse threatens not only our moral order but the 
very foundations of our polity. The crisis in trust is indicative of the general crisis-
society in which we live today (Strathern 2004a), and it is perhaps the social forms that 
this crisis-awareness and responsiveness has taken (e.g. audit cultures, evidence-based 
policy, interdisciplinary research), that has spawned the idea of a concomitant 
breakdown of solidarity, cooperation and moral responsibility, of which trust appears to 
be their epiphenomenal expression. 
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 A parallel development of the crisis in trust is the rise of knowledge and risk 
management industries (Power 2004). Because trust and social crises are presented as 
natural enemies, the former rushing out when the latter draw in, social robustness has 
been equated to a kind of omniscience, the capacity to know everything, in particular 
future events. Robust knowledge, of the kind that can be trusted, is therefore knowledge 
that is socially aware of itself (Strathern 2005). Such knowledge is not always easy to 
track, unless, of course, it can become self-evident, which is to say self-deliverable. The 
problem of (the sociology of) knowledge becomes thus one of tele-communication: how 
to bridge the distance between the happening and the cognizance of knowledge. As it 
turns out, the market is the paradigmatic provider of self-deliverable knowledge (where 
the happening and the cognizance coincide), because in the marketplace knowledge is 
delivered as it takes shape (in the form of market signals). The founding father of this 
epistemological economy was Friedrich Hayek, for whom the ‘division of knowledge’, 
that is, the distance between knowledge-happening and knowledge-awareness, was the 
fundamental problem of our time, ‘analogous to, and at least as important as, the 
problem of the division of labour.’ (Hayek 1937: 49)  
 
This article explores some of the assumptions behind the current valence of the notion 
of trust and in particular its entanglement in discourses of social robustness, the 
management and reporting (i.e. tele-communication) of knowledge, and its underlying 
culture and systems of responsibility. I am interested in how knowledge, responsibility 
and social relationality have been organised as epistemologically distanced objects in 
contemporary capitalist regimes of audit and trust-making: objects liable of separation 
(moral crises) and mutual convergence (political ethics). Trust figures thus in this 
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context as an engine of epistemic distance-compression: where knowledge, 
responsibility and mutuality collapse into an identical social form.  
 
I do not see the article, however, as making a contribution to the growing sociological 
literature on trust (e.g. Braithwaite and Levi 2003; Cook 2003; Luhmann 1979; Misztal 
1996; Seligman 1997; Sztompka 1999). The argument is not about trust itself but about 
the kind of theory that we need to resist the temptations of a sociology of trust. A theory 
that looks for the role of trust in social relationships takes for granted Hayek’s 
presuppositions about the ‘division of knowledge’: it takes for granted that divisions 
between knowledge and the world are trust-distances to be traversed and abridged. 
There is no particular reason, however, why an anthropology of trust should work as a 
theory of public epistemology.  
 
Indeed much of the new literature on trust simply recasts our sociological tradition by 
rewriting the canon using trust as the organizing category. We have accounts of trust as 
a form of moral commitment, a character disposition, or a dynamic of ‘encapsulated 
interests’, where trust emerges as a mutual co-implication of interests on all transacting 
parties. These conceptions turn on a notion of trust as a ‘cognitive category’ because ‘all 
depend on assessments of the trustworthiness of the potentially trusted person.’ (Hardin 
2006: 17)  Trust emerges as an epiphenomenon of social knowledge: what people’s 
relationships look like after the fact of cognitive re-appraisals. But this, unfortunately, 
will not do. As mysterious as the concept of trust may be (cf. Möllering 2001), the 
question today is not what trust is but what kind of work the notion does. There is more 
to trust that its relation to cognitive and knowledge structures. Trust may be 
‘encapsulated’ in reciprocal expectations (Hardin 2006) but it is also distributed in a 
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variety of human and nonhuman forms; it is as much a cognitive category as it is a 
material one; indeed, it belongs to the realm of the intersubjective in as much as it 
belongs to the interobjective. It is as much an anthropological object (of theory) as an 
object of social knowledge. The question of trust therefore calls for a kind of theory that 
elucidates not its place in the sustenance of (robust / social) knowledge but its very 
qualities as an anthropological concept. 
 
To this effect, here I take a closer look at the role that trust plays in contemporary 
corporate ethics discourses. I focus in particular on one well-known and influential 
theory of corporate public trust, and compare it with anthropological interest in the 
allocation of responsibility, what Mary Douglas termed ‘forensic theories of danger’ 
(Douglas 1992: 5): how risk, sin, misfortune or blame are distributed across society. 
Here some relationships are cast as being outside ‘reality’, for they play out in the order 
of the occult, which has its own temporality. I then move on to examine the work that 
relationships do when moving in and out of the occult, and contrast various 
anthropological accounts with the kind of temporal work that capitalism demands from 
relationships to remain diaphanous. Whereas anthropological theories of responsibility 
focus on the exigent work that relationships need to do to remain reversible (to move in 
and out of the occult), the new culture of (corporate) ethics has only one version of the 
‘reality’ of relationships: relationships that are real and robust because they are 
transparent, instantaneous and point to no context but themselves. If social and political 
theory has called upon trust as a placeholder for robust public knowledge and prudential 
political choice, an anthropological theory of trust should reaffirm instead the 
trustworthiness of anthropological comparison. 
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Responsible analogues 
 
Every aircraft in the world would be grounded if air traffic control relied on the 
same type of system that companies use today to report their information. Air 
traffic controllers must receive vast amounts of highly technical, constantly 
changing information reported to them quickly in a format they can understand 
and use immediately, and they must have absolute trust that the information is 
complete and accurate every time. Imagine the consequences if those controllers 
could only get their information from an observer on the ground who scribbled a 
few notes, printed them on an old-fashioned press, and mailed the information to 
the control tower once a quarter? (DiPiazza Jr. and Eccles 2002: 129) 
 
Technology, complete and accurate information, and trust. DiPiazza and Eccles’ 
triangulation of concepts echoes an observation made by Max Gluckman over thirty 
years ago in an essay on magical and secular solutions to moral crises. Commenting on 
why certain African societies resorted to divination to understand moral uncertainties, 
Gluckman noted that a possible answer might lie in ‘the limits of their technical 
knowledge.’ These societies have ‘much less knowledge of the empirical causes of 
misfortune and good fortune, present and past. They also have less surety about the 
future.’ (Gluckman 1972: 4) Knowledge, Gluckman was implying, works in a temporal 
register (past, present, future), a reliance itself dependent upon moral qualities. 
Gluckman’s observation tied in with the classical anthropological literature on cultures 
of suspicion and blame in Africa, of which Evans-Pritchard’s work on the Azande was 
the precursor (Evans-Pritchard 1937). In revisiting this tradition, Gluckman wanted to 
understand what makes responsibility tick: on what bases do people make themselves 
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accountable to, or demand accountability from others. Many are the idioms and 
channels, but Gluckman focused on one: the occult. The occult works in ways that are 
hidden, but not invisible. Azande witches, for example, are known to have a black 
substance in their intestines, which can be seen after an autopsy. The substance is 
innocuous unless activated by vicious feelings. Only then is witchcraft set to work. 
Witchcraft is inherited in the patrilineal line, which is why men are not held accountable 
for possessing this power. Responsibility lies not in the person, but in her actions 
towards others. By unconcealing the work of the occult, Azande thus displace 
responsibility away from individuated persons and unto systems of moral adjudication. 
They blame not people but (particular kinds of) relationships. 
 
Gluckman’s essay concludes by noting how magical and secular solutions to moral 
crises ultimately differ in the distribution and attribution of responsibility. Whilst 
African tribal societies use the idiom of the occult to make the moral agency of the 
whole group visible to itself, Western societies, he argued, create structural differences 
within the group, to the point where responsibility is dissipated across the social whole 
(Gluckman 1972: 41). The occult, one would say, is self-eclipsed, hidden within its own 
dissipation. It is not a permanent place but a strategy variously deployed to create 
unities and bifurcations within and between groups. So whereas African societies 
aggrandize their sense of moral endowment, Euro-Americans try to do without a sense 
of moral agency altogether. Elucidation or (dis)closure of the occult thus makes the 
system of moral relations (dis)appear. 
 
Gluckman’s description of how Zande people invocate and set the notion of 
responsibility to work through relationships – through, say, idioms of patrilineal 
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inheritance, women’s fertility or male competition for resources – contrasts with 
DiPiazza and Eccles’ description of the accountability of air traffic controllers, which is 
said to depend exclusively on the availability of information. Robust information makes 
the system morally robust, that is, trustworthy. Poor information, on the other hand, 
flaws the system, because it prevents proper reporting and exposes air traffic controllers 
to perils not of their own making. Morality emerges thus not as an aspect of human 
relationships but as a feature of the infrastructure of information. If we make our 
information more robust, we strengthen our morality. 
 
I noted above that the occult works in ways that are hidden though not invisible. Today 
the Information Age has produced its own veil of visibility-obsessed discourses, of 
which the rhetoric of ‘transparency’ is perhaps the most famous (Strathern 2000b; 
Tsoukas 1997). ‘Information’ and ‘transparency’ emerge as complementary analogues 
in our turn-of-the-century fascination with the institutionalisation of trust (cf. 
Braithwaite and Levi 2003). DiPiazza and Eccles’ manifesto for building a culture of 
public trust in corporations and capital markets draws out the basic discursive economy 
informing this vision. Here trust and information/communication are being hailed as 
two sides of the same coin, namely, moral robustness. What follows is my reading of all 
such suggestions for revamping the infrastructure of the information economy around 
the idea of a kind of information that is morally self-sufficient and trustworthy (e.g. 
Galford and Drapeau 2003; Handy 1995; Joni 2004). 
 
Reporting 
Trust, DiPiazza and Eccles’ tell us, is not a complex affair: ‘some things are simple and 
always will be simple. The effectiveness of the world’s capital markets depends on 
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public trust, and trust depends on the timely availability of complete, relevant, and 
reliable information – in a word, it depends on appropriate levels of transparency.’ 
(DiPiazza Jr. and Eccles 2002: vi, emphasis in the original). Following the Enron and 
WorldCom financial scandals, and more recently, the collapse of financial institutions in 
the aftermath of the credit crunch, trust in capital markets floundered. Investors placed 
trust in corporations that misreported their financial records. A gap opened between 
what investors were told and what the corporations knew. Information, poor 
information, was the name of the gap – the division within knowledge, Hayek would 
have said. 
 
Control of information thus emerged as a fundamental principle dictating how 
corporations ought to organize themselves. In July 2002, for example, the US 
Government signed into law the Sarbanes-Oxley corporate-reform act, which has been 
described as the most significant change to federal financial laws since the 1930s. In the 
UK, the Financial Reporting Council published in July 2003 the Combined Code on 
Corporate Governance. This document includes the Code itself and related guidance: 
the Turnbull guidance on Internal Control, the Smith guidance on Audit Committees, 
and various pieces of good practice guidance from the Higgs report. DiPiazza and 
Eccles’ work is written in the spirit of these reforms. Central to the consolidation of an 
information economy, they argue, is the building of a robust architecture through which 
information must flow. They call their own framework the Corporate Reporting Supply 
Chain (CRSP). CRSP identifies the actors who at some point will get their hands on 
corporate information. These include a company’s executives, its board of directors, 
independent auditors, information distributors, third-party analysts, investors and other 
stakeholders. An anthropologist would say that CRSC invokes an image of distributed 
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agency: responsibility is at once located and distributed. There is however a particular 
direction to the way information is here being distributed, which is given away by the 
notion of ‘reporting’. The term is illuminating because it suggests that information is 
always gathered for external consumption. The corporation keeps ‘externalising’ itself – 
emptying itself out for others. This is also why DiPiazza and Eccles define 
‘transparency’ as making available information that investors would want (DiPiazza Jr. 
and Eccles 2002: 4). 
 
Reporting information is not as easy as it sounds, however. DiPiazza and Eccles observe 
that in the corporate world there are at least three orders of reality wherein information 
takes shape. The orders add up to form what they call the ‘Three-tier model of corporate 
transparency’ (DiPiazza Jr. and Eccles 2002: 14), and note that it is imperative to 
develop standards to certify the robustness of information for each and every one of 
these orders. The three tiers are: (i) global generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP); (ii) industry-specific information, and; (iii) company-specific information. 
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles are used worldwide, in various guises as 
national or international standards, to come up with a figure of value for a company’s 
financial record and performance. Critiques of GAAP abound, and it is not my concern 
here to summarize nor explore them in detail. Suffice to say that an important limitation 
to information yielded by GAAP is the premium it places on a particular temporal 
register. Different accounting principles use different temporal horizons to evaluate 
assets: some value assets at historical cost, some at market value. The issue is important 
because it shows that the orders that are invoked to determine where one ought to look 
for information are not simply institutional (i.e. accounting standards, industry and/or 
company contexts) but ultimately holographic (Strathern 1995: 17): a company that 
 9
favours a historical evaluation of its assets purposely defines the nature of its intangible 
relation to itself (through time) in terms very different to those of a company that opts 
for a current market valuation. In each case, the tangible and the intangible are given 
expression in terms that evoke different conceptions of time, relations (to original cost, 
in the former; to the market, in the latter) and to the structure of the business 
(consolidated in the past or dispersed in the market). I return to the question of 
intangibility later. 
 
Whilst real progress towards developing global accounting standards has already been 
made by the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the European 
Commission’s approval in May 1999 of the Financial Services Action Plan, developing 
frameworks that will enable global comparability in Tiers II and III is far more difficult. 
It is at this juncture that DiPiazza and Eccles’ vision for the future of corporate 
reporting takes a new turn. Difficult as the development of these global comparable 
information frameworks may prove, it is imperative, they stress, that they do come into 
existence. In fact, they will be brought into life, if only because the market, sooner or 
later, will coerce them out: ‘One of the facts of corporate life… is that if industries do 
not take the initiative to develop these standards, someone else will do so to meet the 
market demand.’ (DiPiazza Jr. and Eccles 2002: 59) Unlike the IASB and the EU’s 
supranational initiatives, DiPiazza and Eccles can only envisage Tiers II and III of their 
model of corporate transparency in relation to the global market. ‘If the standards are 
sound,’ they write, ‘all stakeholders will find them valuable and will exert pressure on 
other companies to report on that basis. The pressure will be applied either directly (by 
demanding the information) or indirectly (by not investing in the companies’ stocks, not 
buying their products, protesting their labor practices, and so on).’ (DiPiazza Jr. and 
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Eccles 2002: 77) In other words, standards and information are mobilized to make 
globality and the market appear. My point here is not about the mercantilist orientation 
to the production of information that underlies DiPiazza and Eccle’s vision. Instead I 
want to bring attention to the mode of argumentation that brings ideas about ‘markets’, 
‘information’ and ‘trust’ to bear on one another, and to the kind of institutional 
economy that arises from such interfoldings. Take the case of environmentalism. 
DiPiazza and Eccles cite a PricewaterhouseCoopers Management Barometer Survey 
which queried 157 U.S. executives about the ‘real value drivers’ behind their 
businesses. These should be the drivers that corporate reporting ought to focus on. 
Lowest on the consultant’s survey turned out to be ‘community involvement and 
environmental performance’; highest, ‘product and service quality’. They explain: ‘U.S. 
companies in the aggregate – there are huge exceptions – have not had to confront a 
sustained environmental or community-focused protest or inquiry that chips away at a 
firm’s pride and reputation.’ (DiPiazza Jr. and Eccles 2002: 86) The fact that 
environmental performance has not yet been turned into a ‘value driver’ that markets 
coerce companies into reporting about shows the extent to which the notion of ‘trust’ is 
being deployed and moves in and out of different idioms (e.g. transparency, product and 
service quality, environmentalism) in order to redraw the line that separates the 
corporation from society. In this light, upholding an environmental agenda is not 
something that corporations do for society but what makes the corporation ‘social’ in 
the first place: a corporation that ‘does’ the environment is a socially responsible 
corporation. The perverse effect of this – and this is a point to which I return shortly – is 
that society is only seen to appear at certain points in corporations’ self-representations. 
More importantly, it shows that the current obsession with reporting and information is 
one such point of corporate social self-consciousness. In other words, information has 
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become society’s latest idiom for self-awareness, and an especially dangerous one at 
that, because the idiom allows for the re-description of moral ambivalences in what 
looks like neutral terms – hence the categorisation of environmentalism as an 
insignificant market value driver. 
 
There is a further effect to this ‘informationalisation’ of (moral) knowledge. The 
consolidation of information (for reporting standards) works by nesting knowledge 
inside out. This is a way of ‘undoing’ knowledge by turning (robust) knowledge 
obtained at one level into (questionable) information for use at a different level. For this 
is what the directionality of the Corporate Reporting Supply Chain in fact does: 
knowledge in the hands of a company’s executives becomes information in the hands of 
its board of directors. Reporting makes all knowledge implode outwardsi in the form of 
information for external use. Said differently, information moves freely and respects no 
changes in scale: information nests information that connects to other information that 
informs other information that relates to other information that explains other 
information, and so on.ii If information connects everything, then divisions and 
incisions are no longer easy to make. The point echoes Gluckman’s remark about the 
place of the occult in the imagination of the pressures that worked either to divide or 
unite the group. Today, the work of the occult hides in the over-visibility (i.e. 
transparency) of its idiom of expression: information. 
The capacity of information to cross scales also helps explain why it is that 
organizations image themselves internally on the processes that image them externally. 
DiPiazza and Eccles provide an example: 
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The only way a company can know if it adequately meets the information needs of 
stakeholders is to ask them through surveys, for example, or direct dialogue. 
Royal Dutch/Shell Group of Companies seeks input from its stakeholders about 
how well the company is meeting its commitment to sustainability… If this is 
accomplished, the company will know that it knows what stakeholders want, 
rather than imagining that it knows. (DiPiazza Jr. and Eccles 2002: 113, emphasis 
in the original) 
When knowledge and information become the claims a company can make to social 
robustness a number of things follow. Robustness, for one, conflates information with 
knowledge. The effects of this have been pointed out in numerous occasions, and 
include spiraling virtual economies (e.g. Carrier and Miller 1998), the proliferation of 
audit cultures (e.g. Miller 2003; Strathern 2000a), and the re-description of morality in 
informational terms (e.g. Parker 1998). My interest here is in the latter. If information 
stands for society, then our informational base stands for our moral choices: We are our 
information, which is why our information needs to be unbiased, pure, elemental. It is at 
this point that DiPiazza and Eccles bring in the example of the air traffic controllers 
with which I opened the essay. Air traffic controllers must be assured that the 
information they receive is complete and accurate at all times. Paper-based information 
will not do the job, because it would take too long to compile and would take too much 
time to read and make sense of. This is why air traffic controllers do not use paper-
based information. Paper-based information, they note, is ‘opaque’, it does not allow 
users to ‘see through or beyond the format. Users get little or no help in analyzing and 
understanding a document’s content or in verifying its accuracy and authenticity.’ In its 
stead, the future of corporate reporting – of information – lies in ‘descriptive data’, that 
is, ‘descriptive information about the information’ (DiPiazza Jr. and Eccles 2002: 132), 
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or information that self-describes itself: that is, information obtained at a ‘granular “data 
element” level.’ (DiPiazza Jr. and Eccles 2002: 167). This new ‘universal language’ for 
data management is in fact already in use and is called Extensible Business Reporting 
Language, XBRL.iii
 
Despite all the rhetoric about information that self-describes itself, the epistemological 
organisation of XBRL is not exempt from its own ‘divisions of knowledge’ (a la 
Hayek): as it turns out, there remains a distance between self-describable information 
and trustworthy knowledge. In DiPiazza and Eccles words, when information is self-
descriptive, the ‘quality of analysis in decision making is severely compromised when 
analysts and investors use information that is not reliable. That is why assurance plays 
such a critical role in establishing a credible analytic foundation’ (DiPiazza Jr. and 
Eccles 2002: 165, emphasis added). So the move to so-called self-descriptive 
information creates its own internal openings: information is only robust (i.e. self-
descriptive) if someone has first assured or certified its quality. Perhaps more 
significantly, closing the gap of (assured) information opens yet another gap, that of the 
quality of the analysis upon which the information is based.iv
 
There is an uncanny resemblance between DiPiazza and Eccles’ effusive endorsement 
of a self-descriptive world of corporate reporting and Max Gluckman’s analysis of 
African allocational systems of responsibility. It seems like they all unpack their own 
working assumptions by reference to occult or out-placed forces. All appear to depend 
on an outside agency or external certification to explicate themselves. So what is it that 
remains invisible in this our modern world of over-revealed and ultra visible 
knowledge? 
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 Un-knowing risks 
Underlying DiPiazza and Eccles’ portrayal of how turn-of-the-century corporations 
manage their knowledge there is a hoard of sometimes explicit, more-often-than-not 
implicit references to the idea of risk. DiPiazza and Eccles conclude their book by 
noting that building ‘public trust should never be confused with denying investors’ 
responsibility to make sound decisions based on high-quality analysis, clarity about the 
risks they assume, and their own risk management choices.’ (DiPiazza Jr. and Eccles 
2002: 172) This is a penetrating statement that at once illuminates and summarizes the 
working assumptions behind their bold vision: Trust is played off against ideas of 
clarity and the transparency of information, individual responsibility, and risk. 
 
That we live in a society where our relationship to the world is increasingly being 
redefined in terms of risks is of course something that commentators have been pointing 
out for quite some time now (e.g. Beck 1992; Giddens 1990). In the world of 
institutions, for instance, ‘risk management’ is the latest of these re-descriptive 
exercises (Power 2004). Notwithstanding, for Russell Hardin, the relationship between 
risk and trust is difficult to make sense of at the grand level of macrosociology; it does 
not make sense to talk about an increase in the importance of risk in our lives. When 
risks do appear, they take the form of moral evaluations, what he calls ‘sizing people 
up’ (Hardin 2006: 37). Such moments of moral risk-taking occur, in his view, at the 
margins of an expanding sociality: 
 
the risks that distinguish our condition are not risks of the catastrophic demise of 
all of us, or even many of us, but rather risks at the margin of opportunities that 
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are more varied than what earlier generations have known. At the margin we face 
far more opportunities for cooperating for mutual benefit with a wider array of 
people. (Hardin 2006: 38, emphasis added) 
 
The link between risk and morality is well known to anthropologists. Mary Douglas’ 
pioneering work on risk cultures (Douglas and Wildavsky 1982) emerged out of her 
engagement with the corpus of African strategies for allocating blame, sin and, 
ultimately, responsibility that I mentioned above. Africans divinatory negotiations with 
the occult signalled their political commitment to police their communities as they 
decided whom to blame for sinning, engendering vicious feelings, or endangering the 
group. Blaming was used as a ‘forensic theory of danger’ (Douglas 1992: 5), a way of 
making the unknown morally knowable. In this context, moral self-consciousness is 
externalised in the idiom of danger and instrumentalised in the politics of uncertainty 
and blame. However, at a time when uncertainties have been de-occulted through audit 
regimes and the politics of transparency, who gets to take the blame and who passes the 
buck? (cf. Frankenberg 1972) Douglas has no doubt: ‘The idea of risk could have been 
custom-made. Its universalizing terminology, its abstractness, its power of 
condensation, its scientificity, its connection with objective analysis, make it perfect. 
Above all, its forensic uses fit the tool to the task of building a culture that supports a 
modern industrial society.’(Douglas 1992: 15) Risks, in other words, take the blame; 
they emerge as the sociological buffer that lubricates the dissipation of responsibility 
that Gluckman spoke about. Risks suck – the moral out of society (cf. Ericson and 
Doyle 2003b). 
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While I have no contention with Douglas’ lucid insight into the workings of the moral 
imaginaries of modern society, I would like to pay closer attention to the concrete 
institutional forms that these imaginaries are taking. I believe the way the languages of 
information, risk and trust have been brought to bear on the reorganization of our 
knowledge institutions can be adumbrated in new and original ways by the toolkit of the 
anthropologist. At a time when the visibility and management of knowledge is king, the 
anthropologist’s knowledge of the ways in which the occult works could serve an 
unexpected purpose. I want to follow here the lead of Bill Maurer, who in his work on 
Islamic banking and insurance has exposed recent sociological analyses of risk for 
presuming a universally pervasive technical discourse of calculability, rationality and 
actuary, as if the management of risk and morality were truly incommensurable affairs. 
As the case of Islamic insurance practices makes apparent, where mutuality and 
cooperation run at the heart of why people subscribe life insurance policies, the 
measurements taken by the actuary are always-already a moral technology (Maurer 
2005: 151-152). What follows aims to expand Maurer’s insights by exploring the 
imbroglio of risk and the moralities of trust in a continuum of yet further entanglements. 
 
Funds of trust 
In her closing statement to the introductory essay in Risk and Blame, Douglas coins a 
turn of phrase that throws new light over the preceding discussion on corporate 
reporting and the self-description of transparent information. ‘Blaming’, she writes, ‘is a 
way of manning the gates through which all information has to pass.’ (Douglas 1992: 
19) The image of blaming as a fund of information that circulates around society is an 
economic image. It is another way of saying that information is a blaming-resource used 
by society to reallocate its funds of responsibility. Economists would see this stretching 
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of their discipline as a stretching of the imagination. But anthropologists would know 
otherwise. Anthropologists know Mauss. 
 
Marcel Mauss’ analytic on giving economies can be profitably applied to the study of 
the way modern capitalist society funds its trusts of responsibility. The study of hunter-
gatherer societies has in fact benefited from this use of the Maussian framework for 
quite some time now (e.g. Bird-David 1990;  Ingold 2000). Tim Ingold, for example, 
has described hunter-gatherer’s relationship to the environment as an economy of trust 
(Ingold 2000). Unlike Euro-Americans, who objectify the environment as an alienated 
presence to their humanity, hunter-gatherers conceive of themselves as co-participants 
in a non-divisible social nature, along other forms of life such as spirits and animals. 
One’s relationship to the environment and its life-forces takes therefore the form of a 
mode of engagement rather than the exercise of power and control. In this light, hunting 
is not seen as a coercive operation, an encroachment or intervention upon the alienated 
and objectified animal. As Ingold puts it, animals ‘are not just ‘there’ for the hunter to 
find and take as he will: rather they present themselves to him.’ (Ingold 2000: 71) 
Rather than an act of violence hunting is seen as a process of negotiation, one of the 
many forms that the ‘sharing’ of the environment between equal co-dwellers may take. 
Ingold argues that in this ‘cosmic economy of sharing’ (Bird-David 1992) relationships 
between co-dwellers are therefore based on an underlying principle of trust. Unlike 
other forms of cooperative relationships (cf. Gambetta 2000b), like confidence, trust 
‘presupposes an active, prior engagement with the agencies and entities of the 
environment on which we depend; it is an inherent quality of our relationships towards 
them.’ (Ingold 2000: 71) Trust, then, emerges as the natural disposition informing 
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hunters’ relationship to animals in a world underwritten by ‘the willingness to give.’ 
(Ingold 2000: 71)  
 
Despite the emphasis on the flow of trust that informs sharing as a giving economy, 
Ingold recognises that hunters’ relationship with animals contains an element of risk 
too. ‘Trust’, he writes, ‘always involves an element of risk – the risk that the other on 
whose actions I depend, but which I cannot in any way control, may act contrary to my 
expectations.’ (Ingold 2000: 70) Yet we know from the preceding discussion on cultural 
systems of blaming and corporate models of knowledge-management that risk is not 
something internal to relationships. Relations appear as risky only under certain 
systems of moral accountability. So what would an economy where trust and risk are 
external to the work of relations look like? In other words, what would lie after trust 
(and risk) if these were the forms that relationships took when they emptied themselves 
out? What follows draws its theoretical impetus from Rane Willerslev’s ethnography of 
Yukaghir hunting cosmology (Willerslev 2007). 
 
Hunting transactions 
The Yukaghirs are a small group of indigenous hunters living in the basin of the 
Kolyma River in northeastern Siberia. They hunt for elk and sable, which are the two 
pillars of their hunting economy. Here I focus on the moose (elk) economy, because it is 
moose hunting that evokes the caring, giving environment that Ingold and Bird-David 
talk about. 
 
Willerslev tells us that the Yukaghirs hold a perspectival ontology on the world 
(Willerslev 2004). In this worldview, human and non-human persons each inhabit a 
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position of ‘humanness’ in the world which is given to them by their body and the 
relational perspective they hold on themselves and their environment. Willerslev, 
echoing Viveiros de Castro (1998), says it clearly: ‘an evil spirit or a predatory animal 
will see a human as prey, to the same extent that prey animals will see humans as evil 
spirits or predators. The point is that different species see things in similar or identical 
ways to humans, but what they see is different and depends on the body they have.’ 
(Willerslev 2004: 629-630) This perspectival view on their environment underlies the 
personal qualities with which Yukaghirs endow their relationships with the animals and 
the forest. When arriving in the forest, for instance, hunters will address the master-
spirits of the rivers and trees they walk past as ‘fathers’ and ‘mothers’, and will refer to 
themselves as the ‘children’ or ‘grandchildren’ of the spirits (Willerslev 2007: 42). The 
use of kin terms signals the extent to which the Yukaghirs conceive their relationship 
with the spirits as one of mutual caring. Mutual caring translates into and is present in, 
for instance, the provisioning of food, which is premised on principles of sharing not 
unlike those that organize the economy of human persons. Willerslev tells us that the 
Yukaghirs run a ‘demand sharing’ economy, where people are expected to make claims 
on other people’s possessions, and where those who posses are expected to give freely 
without expectation of repayment. 
 
When sharing becomes a principle of moral coercion, ‘giving’ acquires a second, more 
profound profile than that of simple ‘obligation’. Yukaghirs recognise that the personal 
relations between spirits and humans are laden with the same resentments and 
ambiguities that make up all social life. Willerslev tells us the story of an elderly 
Yukaghir woman, Akulina Shalugin, who lost a friend and the latter’s son to the 
jealousy of Khozyain, the master spirit. Khozyain fell in love with Akulina’s friend, 
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Igor, and kept sending him animals to hunt. The animals kept coming to Igor, who 
could hardly believe his luck. Yet Igor’s overhoarding of animals eventually enabled 
Khozyain to stake out his own claims, which he enforced by dragging the ayibii (soul) 
of the couple’s son and thus killing him. Igor’s luck in hunting had translated into an 
overaccumulation of the ayibii of Khozyain’s children (the souls of animals). In 
claiming Igor and his son’s life back, Khozyain was merely holding them accountable to 
the very same principles of ‘demand sharing’ that govern all human sociability 
(Willerslev 2007: 45). The moral is clear: things are not what they appear, and moral 
virtues mean nothing unless referred to specific social strategies of accountability. 
 
The ‘prey-predator oscillation’ (Willerslev 2007: 45) that underscores Akulina’s story 
finds parallels in other dimensions of Yukaghir hunting and social life at large. In fact, 
Yukaghirs’ own strategic engagement with the inherent dangers of this cosmic economy 
of sharing is by means of what they call pákostit, meaning ‘to play dirty tricks’ in 
Russian (Willerslev 2007: 48). This game of trickery takes place in terms of what 
Willerslev calls a process of ‘sexual seduction’, the playing of an ‘illusion of lustful 
play’ through which hunters hope to make spirits believe ‘that what is going on is not a 
premeditated kill but a “love affair” with the hunter.’(Willerslev 2007:48). The game of 
seduction is in fact set in motion several days before the hunt itself. Hunters start by 
attempting to conquer their human smell by going to the sauna. Other tactics of 
seduction include avoiding the language of hunting altogether and feeding vodka and 
tobacco to the fire in order to get the master spirit into a slightly drugged and lustful 
mood. The drugging of the spirits is the first step in the final seduction movement, 
which takes place the evening before the hunt (Willerslev 2004: 642-643). On that 
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night, hunters will travel in their dreams to the house of the spirits and make love to 
them. Willerslev sums the process of seduction thus: 
 
the feelings of sexual lust that [a hunter’s] ayibii evokes in the master-spirit during 
their nightly intercourse are somehow extended to the spirit’s physical 
counterpart, the animal prey. Thus, when he locates an elk the next morning and 
starts imitating it, the animal will run towards him in the expectation of 
experiencing a climax of sexual excitement, and he can shoot it dead. Thus, what 
we are dealing with is in principle two analogous hunts: the ‘visible’ hunt of the 
hunter seducing the elk, and preceding this, the ‘invisible’ hunt in which his ayibii 
sedices the animal’s master-spirit. (Willerslev 2007: 101) 
 
Deceit does not end up with the death of the animal but is carried over into the time 
after the killing. A hunter will for instance try to avoid an attack from the animal’s 
disappointed spirit by making a wooden miniature model of himself and painting it with 
blood from the dead animal. On leaving the hunting grounds, the hunter will leave the 
figure behind, in the hope that the spirit will think that the murderer is still around 
(Willerslev 2007: 129).  
 
Eclipsed in the economy of trust and sharing there is therefore an economy of deceit and 
deception. This is not to say that the principles and relationships of care and duty that 
are upheld in the former are therefore reversed by and reducible to the trickery 
expressed in the latter. Trust, writes Diego Gambetta, ‘begins with keeping oneself open 
to evidence, acting as if one trusted, at least until more stable beliefs can be established 
on the basis of further information.’(Gambetta 2000a: 234) Among the Yukaghirs, 
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humans and spirits work out their relationships by placing their trust on particular 
transactional registers (cf. Strathern 2004b), of which kinship, wealth, love, lust and 
deceit are emerging, displaceable forms, taking turns in performing an ‘as if’ condition 
for the others.v Each one of these may signal to, even take the form of trust. But trust 
itself resides in no one of them, but in the movement through which relationships out-
place themselves and extend themselves into new analogical forms. These moments of 
temporal suspension and out-placement echo Russell Hardin’s point about how trust 
tenses itself at the margins of an expanding sociality. The visibility and invisibility of 
which Willerslev speaks seems to be part of this recursive movement: an appearance of 
trust in the disappearance of other forms, and vice versa. Trust thus emerges as the 
forever self-eclipsing relationship through which people re-place themselves into new 
relationships, and in this capacity it truly functions as a ‘device for coping with the 
freedom of others.’ (Gambetta 2000a: 219) 
 
Reversible and in/visible trust 
In a report on the Canadian government’s recent reform of its internal auditing 
architecture, Basil Orsini, director of the project, comments: ‘Many auditors are 
wrestling with what [the evaluation and improvement of the governance process] means 
in practice and how to audit governance, so much of which is intangible.’ (Orsini 2004) 
The idea of the ‘audit of governance’ evokes a curious image: the making ‘transparent’ 
(audit) of that which is already radically transparent (intangible governance). Making 
transparent that which is already transparent entails a kind of reversible movement: like 
revealing a container’s inside not by emptying it out but by turning it inside out. 
Whereas the former keeps some things hidden (the container’s interior), the latter 
aspires to reveal it all. 
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 The reversibility of transparency evoked by Orsini echoes Willerslev’s description of 
the strategic movements of Yukaghirs in and out of the visible and invisible hunting 
economies. The Yukaghirs, like the auditors, know that (human and non-human) 
persons struggle to make their relationships to one another knowable. Relationships are 
always clothed in thin robes, and more often than not their concrete qualities disappear 
from view. They move in and out of tangibility and intangibility, and it is the very fact 
that this is possible that allows people to keep their social life alive in the first place. 
There are things that are better not known, which is why they are transacted in an 
invisible idiom. Willerslev talks about two hunts: one which takes place in the invisible 
realm of dreams, one that takes place in the visible realm of bloody physical encounters. 
I would like to suggest, however, that although at some level these are indeed 
distinctive realms, at another level the visible and the invisible play out as reversible 
idioms within any one realm. Take the game of seduction. Hunters first make their 
killing intentions invisible to spirits by drugging them with alcohol and tobacco; they 
also hide their own human smell by bathing in the sauna, and encode their hunting 
language in metaphor and figurative language. These are all transactions that take place 
in the physical world of human persons. People relate to other people visibly in order to 
make their motivations invisible to their invisible kinsfolk (spirits). This game of 
reversible intentions takes a further twist when the hunter dreams himself into the 
invisible world of spirits. Here the second hunt takes place, clothed this time in the 
idiom of sexuality. Hidden in the sexual act are the real intentions of the hunter, which 
will only reveal themselves the following morning, when elk and hunter meet again in 
the visible world of humans. Yet not even this encounter is terminal, for hunters must 
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once again revert to the idiom of invisibility, covering their culpability by leaving a 
miniature model of themselves behind. 
 
Intangibility, time and value 
Why, then, do auditors, unlike hunters, want to make all knowledge visible? And what 
consequences may this have for knowledge itself? 
 
Social relationships require different temporal registers to play out their potency in full. 
Yukaghirs cannot just go and hunt elk. They need and take time to seduce the animal. 
They require time to build up the corporeal and perspectival efficacy and 
trustworthiness that will coerce moose out from their Khozyain’s pen. The requirement 
of temporality is perhaps surprising in light of the emphases that DiPiazza and Eccles’ 
auditors place on real-time transactions and knowledge. Real-time knowledge fits of 
course with the paradigm of self-described information that DiPiazza and Eccles speak 
about. Both ‘real-time’ and ‘self-described information’ are ultimately and radically 
‘transparent’, because they refer to no temporal or informational domain except their 
own. All information is forever present in its self-description, and all knowledge is 
forever tied up to its unique moment of revelation. Deleuze and Guattari have described 
capitalism’s economy of immanence in similar terms: ‘capitalism functions as an 
immanent axiomatic of decoded flows (of money, labor, products).’ Such flows may be 
realized in a variety of modes (a democratic, dictatorial or totalitarian state), ‘but they 
are nonetheless isomorphous with regard to the world market’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994 [1991]: 106). This is another way of saying that institutional life is being 
reorganized around the credibility of isolated value-episodes, such as data delivered in 
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XBRL self-sustained format or transactions that are real enough because they happen 
now. 
 
The institution that organizes itself around these dictums is in danger of 
institutionalising a ‘dialytical’ form of social organisation, one which keeps purifying 
itself by forever removing itself from its own conditions of existence. Dialytical 
organisations place no premium on intangibility: all things intangible need to be known, 
all occult relations brought to the fore. The fore is, of course, the market. I noted above 
that today companies have at their disposal competing accounting principles for 
evaluating their assets. Historical and market values are two such models, and it is 
perhaps no surprise that the latter are gaining currency. For whereas the former give 
value to intangible historical assets, the latter disperse value in the real-time, self-
referred information that are market prices. The kind of knowledge that obtains from 
linking-up market signals is of a very particular kind, not least because relationality in a 
market model tends to zero-out temporality from the substance of the intangible. 
  
Conclusion 
Herman Melville’s wonderful novel, The Confidence-Man, makes a most suggestive 
reading in these times of financial meltdowns when capitalist society holds on display 
the very best of its ruinous condition. Melville’s Confidence-Man was of course a 
parody of those cultures of masquerading that held trust as a moral currency when all 
around them stood nothing but a hall of mirrors for financial bubbles, shambles and 
scams – trust as an aspiration, a structure of hope, caught up in its own delusions. 
Melville’s portrayal of 19th century American pragmatism, as Deleuze put it, 
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exemplified the corruption of trust into a society of charity  (Deleuze 2005 [1993]: 86-
92). 
 
A culture of masquerading is as good a title as any for the political economy of the 
contemporary sociology of trust. Indeed, an intriguing play of analogical conversions 
between the opaque and the diaphanous – of the visions, revisions and in-visions of the 
masquerade – appears to be at work in the New Corporate Ethics (corporate reporting, 
global governance, corporate social responsibility). Transparency, accountability and 
trust (diaphaneity) have been mobilized against the dark forces of secrecy, uncertainty 
and risk (opacity). The movement in and out of opacity and diaphaneity further works 
on a particular temporal thrust: the ‘reality’ of time, and thus the ‘reality’ of 
relationships. Real relationships are the epitome of ethical and trustworthy sociality 
because their value is self-evident: it is self-describable, radically visible (there is no 
premium on intangibility), and openly knowledgeable. Public trust as political 
epistemology (Corsín Jiménez 2010).   
 
Real relationships, however, are sustained on a rather unreal, or at the very least 
unstable social structure: one that is characterised by a continuous emptying-out of 
relationships and that I have called ‘dialysis’. Under conditions of dialysis, social 
knowledge is subjected to a constant externalisation of itself through its breaking down 
into ever narrower constituents. In this light, the notion of trust works as a ‘dialytical’ 
concept: a concept that requires to breakdown (or purify) its own context of action to 
convey meaning. Trust works by creating its own preconditions of existence, which 
must in turn be certified as trustworthy. Audit cultures are the classic example: the audit 
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makes the culture trustworthy, which in turn holds trust as a value capable of audit (cf. 
Power 1994). 
 
Unlike the epistemological diaphaneity of the audit economy, the Yukaghirs hunting 
economy is both an economy of trust and an economy of mistrust; it is about sharing 
and about deceiving, about making relationships visible and invisible, all at once. I tried 
to capture this recursive movement of social knowledge in and out of its own analogical 
conversions by saying that social relationships amongst the Yukaghir were reversible. 
Moving in and out of its own idioms of the visible and the occult, reversibility turns 
Annelise Riles’ famous notion of the ‘inside out’ into an analytical aesthetic itself (Riles 
2001). When trust becomes the relational idiom that traverses the distance between 
knowledge / public / the social, we might want to consider instead how to conceptualise 
the very movement in and out of such traversing. My suggestion here is that 
reversibility functions as an anthropological concept (of the concept) of relationality 
(Corsín Jiménez and Willerslev 2007). 
 
Reversibility is founded on knowledge’s own knowledge of its instability and 
ambiguousness. The Yukaghirs do not hide this, which is why their social transactions 
constantly enfold motifs of hiddenness and trust unto themselves. Another way of 
saying this is that they manage the unity of their social world through the administration 
of its disunity or division. This is also the lesson that Gluckman urged us to draw from 
the African material. We need divisions and disruptions to know what unites and 
integrates. We need the occult to know why some things are worth making visible. We 
need a realm that lies after trust to make trust meaningful. There is, in a sense, no trust 
in society except in an ‘after-trusting’ mode. If public trust functions as the political 
 28
epistemology of neoliberal society, an anthropological theory of trust ought perhaps to 
reaffirm instead our trust in anthropological theory and comparison. 
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i An oxymoron – but the image works because it is the forwarding of knowledge to 
external users that breaks-up its constitution and reduces it to ‘information’. 
ii This is what Tsoukas calls the ‘self-referentiality’ of media messages (Tsoukas 1997: 
833). 
iii ‘XBRL is a dialect of XML (Extensible Markup Language), a new Internet language 
that defines and names data… XML enables the exchange of data between disparate 
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software applications through the use of informational tags that self-describe what a 
piece of information is.’ (DiPiazza Jr. and Eccles 2002: 134) 
iv ‘The provider of independent assurance on this point would need a great deal of 
business expertise and professional judgment’ (DiPiazza Jr. and Eccles 2002: 166, 
emphasis added) 
v On ‘as if’ conditions as a modality of social life, see Riles (2006: 17) and Wagner 
(1986). 
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